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Abstract
For North Korea, product market integration would generate large welfare gains,
sufficient to end the famine.  Additional gains could be had through military demobilization.  For
the South, the impact of product market integration would be trivial, but the impact of factor
market integration would be considerable, affecting the composition of output, distribution of
income, and rate of growth.
Given moderately rapid technological convergence, expected levels of cross-border
migration, and equalization of rates on return on capital, per capita incomes in the North would
remain well below those in the South for an extended period.
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The North Korean economy has been in decline for the better part of a decade.  Under
duress, the current regime has undertaken some modest reforms, but these have not fundamentally
altered the centrally planned character of the economy and are unlikely to reverse the economy’s
downward spiral.   In one poll of scholars, 38 percent of the respondents predicted that the
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current regime would not last a decade (Y.S. Lee, 1995).  In a more recent poll, the respondents’
mean subjective probability of collapse was 26 percent, while the mean estimate of significant
reform was 40 percent (Noland, 1998, Table 1).
One obvious direction of reform would be marketization of the economy and openess to
greater interaction with the outside world — including South Korea.  Greater North-South
economic integration, either in the context of a reform strategy initiated by the North or in the
context of collapse and absorption by the South, potentially could have profound effects on both
economies, yet scant effort has been devoted to constructing economic models to analyze this
possibility. In this paper, we start from incomplete data ridden with gross measurement errors
and, using cross-entropy estimation techniques, construct the underlying data base for a
computable general equilibrium model (CGE) of Korean economic integration.  This estimation
approach is powerful and flexible, allowing us to make full use of what information we have in
whatever form. CGE modeling forces internal consistency.  The end product, the Korean
Integration Model (KIM), is a two-country CGE model linking the North and South Korean
economies. The model incorporates fragmentary information in a rigorous way and allows us to
examine the implications of a number of alternative integration scenarios, extending previous
studies of integration by Noland, Robinson, and Liu ((NRL) 1998, 1998) which used an earlier
version of KIM.  The new KIM is an updated version of the earlier model described in NRL
(1999).
The NRL studies developed an eight-sector, four-factor, constant-returns-to-scale CGE
model of the North and South Korean economies calibrated to 1990, the most recent year before
North Korea entered a period of severe macroeconomic instability.  These studies concluded that




freeing cross-border trade in goods, but not in factors, the macroeconomic impact on South
Korea would be slight.  In contrast, the impact of economic integration with the North on the
South Korean economy would be non-trivial once restrictions on cross-border labor and mobility
were removed.  In particular, there would be a shift in the South Korean distribution of income
toward capital, and within labor toward urban high-skill labor, suggesting increased income and
wealth inequality in the South once capital began flowing North and labor began flowing South. 
However, under one scenario, the present discounted value of the South Korean income stream
under integration actually exceeded the baseline no integration figure, indicating that the South
Korean economy as a whole could be better off with integration and also indicating that, with
proper redistribution, economic integration of the Korean peninsula could be Pareto-improving—
everyone would be better off.
This result crucially depended on two modeling assumptions, however.  First, the form of
capital transer from the South to the North had to take the form of profit-making investment
which yielded a stream of remitted profits to Southern investors.  If the transfers were modeled as
grants, capital earnings would remain in the North, and the possibility of economic integration
that would benefit the South relative to a no integration baseline would disappear.
The result also depended critically on the rapidity of technological convergence between
the North and the South.  In the potentially Pareto-improving case, the North adopts South
Korean technology over the a decade, attaining not only Southern levels of total factor
productivity (TFP), but the Southern input mix as well.  
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In this paper, we extend that earlier work in two principal ways.  First, conditions on the
Korean peninsula have changed considerably since 1990 (the date of calibration of the earlier
models), most obviously with the emergence of a famine in North Korea.  Economic distress has
forced North Korea into greater openness, and as a consequence, more information about the
North Korean economy has become available.  The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) has been working with the government of North Korea to construct standard national
accounts, and some of these data were released to an IMF mission that visited North Korea in3
1997 (IMF, 1997).   Other international bodies such as the Food and Agricultural Organisation
(FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have released data associated with their famine
relief work.  This newly available information has made it possible to extend and recalibrate the
earlier North Korea model to 1996, reflecting North Korea’s changed circumstances.  In
particular, it is now possible to examine the impact of economic integration on the North Korean
famine.  It is also plausible that the process of economic integration could be accompanied by
political rapprochement or unification.  We consequently examine the potential for a “peace
dividend” associated with military demobilization.
These issues can be usefully examined in a comparative static framework.  Some issues are
inherently dynamic, however.  Cross-border investment and technological change will not occur
instantly, so the speed of technological convergence is a critical issue.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992, 1995) present evidence that countries with low initial levels of per capita income tend to
exhibit higher per capita income growth than countries with initially higher per capita income
levels.  That is to say, there is a tendency toward per capita income convergence.  Indeed, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin argue that in a variety of contexts (among US states, among members of the
OECD, among all countries) there is a tendency for poorer regions to converge on the incomes of
richer regions, conditional on other factors, at a rate of roughly two percent annually.
Yet this “two percent rule” is probably inadequate for the task at hand.  Rather than
convergence in the steady state growth paths of regions with at least access to similar production
technology, the economic integration of North and South Korea would arguably put North Korea
on a new growth path, at least transitionally.  Evidence from the German case suggests that the
speed of technological convergence between East and West Germany has been considerably
higher than two percent annually.  Thus in the second part of the paper, we combine the analysis
of cross-border factor flows with the literature on intra-German technological convergence to
examine the implications of realistic estimates of the speed of technological upgrading for income
convergence, the “costs of unification,” and the incentives for cross-border labor migration.
Having raised the comparison with the German case, it is worthwhile to indicate at the
outset some issues that this paper does not address.  Given our model’s medium-to-long-run
orientation, the focus is primarily on sectoral adjustment issues in the context of a simple       There is now a sizable literature on German unification.  See Lipschitz and McDonald (1990), Akerlof et
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al (1991), Sinn and Sinn (1992), Dornbusch and Wolf (1994), Carlin and Meyer (1994), Thimann and Breitner
(1995), Hughes Hallett, Ma, and Melitz (1996), Dyck (1997) among others. 
        See Yeon (1994), Flassbeck and Horn (1996), Noland (1997), and Wolf (1998) for analyses of the lessons
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for Korea from the German experience.
       Another possible scenario is monetary union between North and South Korea.  In a real model such as the
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KIM, with no money or financial markets, monetary union simply implies a unified (or fixed) exchange rate
between the two countries and a unified trade balance as well.
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macroeconomic framework.  For two principal reasons we do not address a number of interesting
macroeconomic issues, such as exchange rate overshooting, which have been prominent in the
literature on German unification.   First, the disimilarity of factor endowments is far more
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pronounced in the Korean case than in the German case (Noland, 1997).  As a consequence,
integration may have more dramatic sectoral implications in the Korean case compared to the
German case.  This fact, combined with the far larger differences in economic size between the
two Koreas compared to pre-unification Germany, suggests that in certain respects the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may be a closer analogue to the prospective Korean
situation than the German experience.  The KIM is well-suited for examining these integration
issues.  
Second, history does not operate by analogy.  There is no particular reason to believe that
adjustment issues that arose in the German case, and which were at least partly due to avoidable
policy mistakes (such as the wage equalization policy), would occur in the Korean case.  Indeed,
the Koreans can learn from the German experience and avoid some of the German errors.   To
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cite a specific example, in contrast to the German wage equalization policy, most Korean analysts
expect the maintenance of the existing demilitarized zone to control population movements after
economic integration and also expect the perpetuation of greatly differing wage structures in the
two halves of the peninsula for some extended period of time (cf. Young, Lee, and Zang, 1998).
Finally, we should observe that in this paper we simply model a customs union and
exchange rate unification; these do not require political unification, just economic integration, and
on the political issue our paper is agnostic.
5
        The exchange rate variable in the model can be seen as a price level deflated (PLD) real exchange rate,
6
deflating by the numeraire cost of living index.  Given that world prices are also assumed to be fixed, it is also
equivalent to the “real effective exchange rate” (Williamson, 1994).
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THE KOREAN INTEGRATION MODEL (KIM)
The KIM is a member of a growing family of trade-focused, multi-country, CGE models
designed to analyze the impact of trade liberalization and the formation of free trade areas and
customs unions. The KIM consists of two linked country CGE models, one for North Korea and
one for South Korea. The rest of the world is included by means of a simple representation of
fixed world prices for North and South Korean exports and imports. The countries are linked by
trade flows, and the model solves for all internal prices, including commodity and factor prices,
and external prices of all goods traded between the two countries. Domestically produced and
traded goods are specified as imperfect substitutes, providing for a realistic continuum of
“tradability” and allowing two-way intersectoral trade.
The KIM has a standard neoclassical specification, except that the model incorporates
severe quantity controls on exports and imports with concomitant distortions in domestic product
and factor markets.  The markets for goods, factors, and foreign exchange are assumed to
respond to changing demand and supply conditions, which, in turn, are affected by government
policies, the external environment, and other exogenous influences. The model can be considered
medium-to-long run in that all factors are assumed to be intersectorally mobile. It is Walrasian in
that only relative prices matter.  Sectoral product prices, factor prices, and the exchange rate are
determined relative to an aggregate consumer price index, which defines the numeraire.  The KIM
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has eleven sectors: rice, other grains, other agriculture/forest/fisheries, mining, light
manufacturing, industrial intermediates, capital goods, construction, public administration, the
military, and services.  There are three “demanders”: a single aggregate household which buys
consumer goods, a government which spends on goods and public administration, and an
aggregate capital account which purchases investment goods.  The government is the sole, and
completely price inelastic, demander of military services.  All goods and services are traded
internationally with the exceptions of construction, public administration, and the military.  
Primary factors of production are land, capital, agricultural labor, high-skill urban labor,       North Korean land is classified as high, medium, or low quality land following the FAO (1997) and the
7
UNDP (1998).   All South Korean land is classified as high quality.  Rice is grown using high and medium quality
land exclusively.
        While we fix external balances, we do not force the trade or current accounts to be balanced (i.e. we fix the
8
trade balance of each country at its observed level in the base).  Indeed, in a subsequent section of the paper, we
subject the unified Korean trade balance to a set of external shocks to explore the real exchange rate implications
of changes in the trade or current account balance.
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and low-skill urban labor.  Aggregate production functions were estimated for aggregate capital
and labor using data reported in Hwang (1993) and Y.S. Lee (1994).  The results are remarkably
robust and plausible given the quality of the underlying data.  Constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) specifications yielded estimates of the aggregate substitutability between capital and labor
of around unity. In most specifications, North Korea exhibited slightly negative TFP growth,
which is typical of many pre-reform socialist economies.  In the CGE model, sectoral production
technology is represented by a set of CES functions of the primary factors to account for lower
elasticities of substitution in sectors such as agriculture, mining, and the military.  Intermediate
inputs are demanded according to Leontief, fixed input-output coefficients.  Labor and capital are
intersectorally mobile; land is specific to agriculture, but mobile among the three agricultural
sectors.   Migration is permitted between rural and urban low-skill labor markets.  On the demand
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side, import demand functions are specified as CES.
The KIM focuses on real trade flows, relative prices, and the real exchange rate. The
aggregate price level in each country is taken as exogenous, and the model does not include
money or other assets. The model includes the basic macro aggregates for each country, including
the government deficit, the balance of trade, and the savings-investment balance. The balance of
trade for each country is fixed exogenously (except when modeling full integration), so the model
does not consider any possible macro feedbacks from trade liberalization to changes in
international capital flows. The macro “closure” for each country is simple. Government revenue
is determined endogenously, given a variety of fixed tax rates, while government expenditure is
fixed exogenously. The government deficit is endogenous. Aggregate investment in each country
is assumed to be a fixed share of total absorption (GDP plus imports minus exports), and
aggregate savings is assumed to adjust to equate total savings and investment.  
8       The volume of "desired" trade is obtained through the use of a gravity model of international trade.  The
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sectoral composition of that trade was estimated using detailed sectoral data on North Korean trade, together with
the equivalent data from South Korea and Japan — North Korea's principal "natural" trading partners according
to the gravity model.  See Noland (1996) or Noland, Robinson, and Scatasta (1997) for details. 
       These taxes present special problems for analysis because they are levied at differential rates depending
10
on the legal status of the transacting parties.  (For example,  the tax wedge imposed on an exchange between two
state enterprises is different than the wedge imposed on a transaction between a state enterprise and a
cooperative.)  Operationally, we assume that the turnover taxes are spread across the industrial sectors with a
slight degree of escalation, as is often observed in CPEs. Implicitly we assume that North Korea is on, rather than
inside, its production possibility frontier, though as argued below, our method of modeling technological transfer
would put them on the frontier whether they were initially on it or not. 
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The KIM includes quantity rationing of both exports and imports. North Korea is assumed
to have levels of “desired” exports and imports that would be typical for a country of its size and
per capita income, but exports and imports are rationed physically, yielding the low levels
observed in the base data.  South Korean trade with North Korea is similarly assumed to be
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rationed in physical terms, and “desired” trade between the two countries is assumed to equal
levels that would be predicted from a gravity model.  Trade liberalization and integration in the
form of a customs union is modeled by removing all quantity rationing and imposing a common
external tariff equal to South Korean tariffs. 
The KIM also includes a facility for modeling exchange rate unification by specifying: (1)
a fixed exchange rate between North and South Korea, and (2) a unified, fixed, balance of trade
for the two countries together. The result is that, in the various experiments done with this
specification, the separate North and South Korean trade balances can vary, but their sum is fixed. 
Modeling Quantity Controls in Trade
In the case of North Korea, the major distortion in the economy is assumed to be
quantitative controls on both imports and exports.  With respect to internal distortions, the largest
single source of revenue is turnover taxes, which is typical in centrally planned economies
(Noland, Robinson, and Wang 1999a, Table 3). These are allocated across the industrial sectors
of the economy.   Sectorally differentiated taxes and subsidies are treated straightfowardly in the
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case of South Korea. Demanders are assumed to treat imports and domestically produced goods








       This approach to modeling import rationing was first used by Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982), who
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discuss the properties of this approach, including questions of incentive compatibility.
       The sectoral export transformation functions are specified as constant elasticity of transformation (CET)
12
functions.
       The degree of sectoral quantity rationing is given in Appendix Table 1.
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function that depends on the relative prices of imports and domestically produced goods on the
domestic market. These demand functions are parameterized according to the “normal” levels of
sectoral imports that one would expect in North Korea without any rationing, given the results
from the gravity model. Then, we assume the difference between desired imports and observed
imports is due to the imposition of quantity rationing by the government. That is: 
where M is imports, D is domestic supply, qr is the quantity rationing rate, and the subscript i
refers to the sector.  
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The model also specifies sectoral export supply functions, where the export supply ratio
depends on the ratio of the export price to the price on the domestic market.  The supply
12
functions are parameterized so that the desired ratio is consistent with the results from the gravity
model.  Symmetrically with the treatment of imports, quantity controls are specified so that actual
exports are less than desired. 
The result is that demanders are forced off their import demand curves, while producers
are forced off their export supply curves.   The distortions are quite large, indicating large
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potential gains from liberalizing trade and allowing markets to clear.  Trade rationing leads to
major distortions in the domestic price system as well.  The equations of the model and further
description are presented in Appendix 2. 
Data
The model utilizes four main databases — macroeconomic and microeconomic Social
Accounting Matrices (SAMs) of North and South Korea for 1996, the most recent year for which9
data is available.  The SAM, described in Appendix 1, is a consistent array of economic
transactions among agents that reconciles the input-output and national accounts.  In the case of
South Korea, the construction of the SAMs was straightforward.  However in the case of North
Korea, in estimating the SAM, we had to draw on a variety of sources, including incomplete
national accounts, sectoral production and trade data, and estimates of government accounts.
These data are not only incomplete, but also probably replete with serious measurement errors. 
For the modeling exercise, we needed various share coefficients from the SAM, such as
sectoral intermediate-input and value-added shares (for production functions) and expenditure
shares (for consumption functions). Our problem was to estimate these coefficients, which
required estimating a consistent SAM for the base-year of the model using scarce data measured
with unknown error. Using standard econometric methods, the problem was essentially hopeless
—there are not enough data to provide enough degrees of freedom to estimate the parameters,
even if we were willing to make very strong assumptions about the error generation process
—which we were not. However, in contrast to the usual situation in econometrics, we had a great
deal of prior information about the parameters to be estimated. The structure of the SAM imposes
powerful adding-up constraints, and we had information about the likely values of the various
coefficients from a variety of sources, including comparative data from past periods and from
other similar countries. The issue was how to use this information efficiently. 
In this situation, we use an estimation approach, which Golan, Judge, and Miller (1996)
call “maximum entropy econometrics”, that draws on information theory. The estimation
philosophy is to use all the information available, including information about the coefficients to
be estimated, but not to assume any information that is unavailable. Our particular estimation
approach applied to the SAMs is described in Golan, Judge, and Robinson (1994) and Robinson,
Cattaneo, and El-Said (1998) and incorporates assumptions of estimation error (errors in
variables) and prior knowledge about parts of the SAM (such as various macro aggregates). We
incorporated prior information about the structure of the SAM by specifying an initial SAM which
serves as a prior in the estimation, and reflected all the information we had (even if inconsistent).
We then estimated a new SAM that is not only “close” to the old SAM — minimizing  a “cross
entropy” measure of the deviation between the two — but one that also: (1) satisfied all the       First, they have an incentive to understate output to increase international aid flows.  Second, as mentioned
14
in the text, the official data appear to refer only to output or resources controlled by the central planners.
Evidence indicates that the military economy and economic activity outside the plan have increased, or at least
have not decreased as rapidly as formal activity under the plan.  Finally, aid flows, which account for a
considerable share of food consumption, do not appear to be included in the official figures.
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adding-up constraints inherent in the definition of a SAM; (2) included any other constraints such
as knowledge about parts of the SAM, (e.g., some of the national accounts or other aggregates);
and (3) incorporated stochastic information about constraints involving measurement error. The
method is both flexible and powerful in dealing with scattered and inconsistent data. 
With respect to the macroeconomic SAM, we retained the assumption that the North
Korean government makes all investments, but introduced a more elaborate revenue-generating
system consistent with the North Korean data.  However, since the North Korean data are
internally inconsistent, the macro SAM does not balance. We estimated that the base GDP is
roughly 32 billion won, higher than the officially reported 23 billion won.   The reason is two-fold. 
First, the officially reported figure appears to exclude the military.  Second, the officially reported
data do not appear to be internally consistent when entered into a consistent SAM.  Even
assuming that little investment has occurred and that the capital stock has actually shrunk, the
1996 figures imply a tremendous decline in output relative to the 1990 SAM constructed by
Noland, Robinson, and Scatasta.  This result suggests that either there were very big reductions in
factor supplies or that much of the economy was operating at ten to 15 percent of capacity.  The
simplest way to generate a consistent macro SAM was to assume higher output.  While it may
well be the case that floods, famine, and the practice of scrapping capital and bartering it for food
have reduced factor supplies, and utilization of remaining capacity is low, there are also reasons to
believe that the actual output is higher than reported by the authorities.   
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With respect to the microeconomic SAM, the inter-industry relations from the Noland,
Robinson, and Scatasta (1997) 1990 micro SAM for North Korea were used as a starting point
(or prior), with some adjustments to reflect the apparent reduction in the capacity utilization rate
(or, alternatively, decline in the value of the North Korean capital stock) and to obtain aggregate        The input-output coefficients contained in the 1990 prior SAM were in turn derived from a pre-reform
15
(1979) Chinese input-output table compiled by the World Bank.  This table was constructed using standard
national accounts (SNA) conventions, expanding on the material product accounts (World Bank, 1985).  The
assumption is that a starting point (or prior) for the inter-industry input-output relations in North Korea is pre-
reform China, reflecting their common links to 1970s vintage Soviet manufacturing technology. This prior was
significantly altered in the estimation procedure.
       In the analysis that follows we interpreted income as a measure of welfare and ignored the role of security
16
and the implications of economic change for military expenditure on the peninsula.  It is possible for example that
part of the welfare gains generated by economic integration could be lost if the two states used the gains to
increase their military threat capabilities.  If economic integration were accompanied by political integration, this
issue would be moot. 
11
consistency within the macro SAM.  
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Urban workers were divided into high-skilled (professional, technical, and managerial) and
low-skilled (the remainder).  The initial starting point for industry employment structure was
taken from pre-reform Chinese data.  The wage premium was calculated on the basis of South
Korean data.  While one might expect a priori that wage dispersion in the North would be less
than in the South, at this level of sectoral aggregation, the skilled wage premium obtained from
the South Korean data was within the dispersion observed in fragmentary data on North Korean
wages.  The share of land in value-added was initially estimated from cross-country comparisons,
yielding reasonable starting estimates of “rental rates” for different types of land.
COMPARATIVE STATICS
We studied integration under two main scenarios.  The first scenario is the formation of a
customs union which involves: (a) the elimination of North Korean quantity rationing of trade, (b)
the elimination of intra-Korean barriers to trade, and c) the adoption of South Korea tariffs as the
common external barrier.  In this scenario, there is product, but not factor, market integration
between North and South Korea.  In this context, we also examined the possibility of a “peace
dividend” obtainable through military demobilization.
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The second main scenario involves four variants on exchange rate unification, in which the
real exchange rate is fixed between North and South Korea.  In the first, capital moves from
South to North Korea until North Korean per capita income rises to 60 percent that of the
South's. In the second variant, this is achieved by allowing labor to migrate from North to South12
Korea.  In the third variant, the per capita income target is achieved through the movement of
both labor and capital.  This formulation not only allows us to calculate the macroeconomic
impacts of product and factor market integration, but also permits us to calculate income and its
distribution with respect to the both the original populations of North and South Korea, and the
post factor market integration distribution of population on the Korean peninsula. In the fourth
variant, the source of capital inflow into North Korea is the rest of the world, not South Korea.
A final issue involves the specification of the production technology in North Korea.  As
argued in Noland, Robinson, and Scatasta (1997), and Noland, Robinson, and Wang (1999),
liberalization of the North Korean economy is likely to involve at least three identifiable effects: 
static reallocation of factors according to comparative advantage; an increase in total factor
productivity (TFP) associated with importation of capital equipment embodying new, superior,
technology developed abroad; and an "obsolescence shock" reduction in the value of the existing
capital stock.
The Static Reallocation Effect
As discussed above, the KIM model assumes that the base solution is highly distorted. 
Both exports and imports are severely quantity rationed, with producers and demanders assumed
to be off their export supply and import demand functions.  While we assume that factors are fully
employed in the base, and therefore the economy is operating on its production possibility
frontier, the composition of output and sectoral allocation of labor is incredibly distorted.  When
we perform counterfactual experiments in which we remove quantity rationing of imports and
exports, the new free-trade equilibrium involves large changes in sectoral production — dramatic
movement along the production possibility frontier — and large changes in relative prices
compared to the initial rationed equilibrium.
Because the base prices are so distorted, even without considering any adjustment costs in
the sense of unemployed resources, we find that the reallocation of resources and changes in the
structure of production lead to a large increase in real gross domestic product (GDP) measured in
equilibrium prices.  Empirically, there are large efficiency gains to be realized by reallocating
resources, even without assuming any unemployment of resources.  We separately consider       This estimate is derived from a regression model relating TFP to imports of capital goods from developed
17
countries, secondary school enrollments, and interaction terms.
13
technological change (and choice of technique) and the impact of assuming that existing capital is
less productive in the reformed economic environment.
Technological Transfer
Recent research suggests that the world is characterized by international technological
spillovers.  These are quite important in the case of developing countries which benefit from
technological innovations abroad primarily transmitted through international trade in capital goods
embodying these innovations.   In the case of North Korea, the parameters estimated by Coe,
Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1996) indicate that complete liberalization would result in a TFP gain
of approximately 18 percent.   In this case a sectorally uniform increase in TFP would be
17 
obtained.  In a later section, we consider the possibility that North Korea converges toward South
Korea technologically, involving a sectorally non-uniform increase in TFP, as well as changes in
the input mix.
Capital Obsolescence
Finally, an important question involves the value after liberalization of the pre-existing
capital stock.  There are two points to consider.  First, due to the putty-clay nature of technology,
the capital stock accumulated under one set of output and factor prices is likely to be sub-optimal
for different relative prices.  While this is true for all economies, the impact is particularly acute
for transition economies, where the relative prices under central planning have been at wild
variance from those observed in world markets (and the notion of optimizing choice of technique
with respect to factor prices has been of questionable relevance).  Second, economies sheltered
from international trade may manufacture products that are essentially worthless in world
markets.  Think of televisions or radios without tuners — both of which are produced in North
Korea.  To the extent that capital is product-specific, this capital would be effectively worthless       This treatment is obviously a stylized one.  One way to think of it is that there are goods with positive prices
18
in autarchy and a world price of zero.  When the economy is opened up, product specific capital would depreciate
instantly. 
       This of course depends on both output and factor prices on the one hand, and demand on the other.  With
19
respect to the former, Akerlof et al. (1991) argue that given the wage equalization strategy, a wage subsidy could
have significantly increased the number of viable enterprizes in East Germany.  With respect to the latter, East
German consumers were well-acquainted with West German consumer goods at the time of unification, and it
has been argued that this familiarity  together with consumption transfers caused a temporary shift in preferences
away from  East German-produced goods.  High wages and demand shocks may have contributed to the size of
the “obsolescence shock” in the German case.
The particular relevance of these arguments in the Korean case is unclear. There is no reason to believe
that under unification the Korean government would follow a policy of income or wage equalization as the
Germans did (indeed Young, Lee, and Zang (1998) advocate the opposite) or under unilateral reform by an
independent North Korea that the necessary resources for a wage subsidy would be available. Consequently, there
is a counterargument that the North Korean capital stock might not decline as much as in the East German case.
Three reasons are given.  First, there is no reason to expect the Koreans to follow a wage equalization policy as
the Germans did in the event of unification. Second, since the North Koreans are considerably more isolated than
the East Germans, they are presumably less familiar with South Korean consumer goods and may not have access
to consumption transfers on the scale the East Germans did.  Moreover, it is possible that having observed the
German case, in the event of a North Korean collapse, South Korean authorities would restrain their firms from
flooding the North Korean market with consumer goods.  All of these forces would encourage North Koreans to
continue buying home goods, maintaining the value of the North Korean capital stock.
Second, the East Germans lost their major markets in other centrally planned economies, contributing
to the decline in the capital stock.  It has been asserted that China represents a viable market for cheap, low
quality North Korean manufactured goods.
If one accepts these arguments, then one should focus on the previously described scenarios in which the
value of the North Korean capital stock is implicitly maintained.
       There is anecdotal evidence that under the pressure of famine, North Korea has been dismantling its capital
20
stock and bartering it with China as scrap in exchange for food.
14
when the economy was opened up to trade.
18
Sinn and Sinn (1992) report that one-half to two-thirds of East Germany's capital stock
was worthless after unification.   If lack of exposure to international trade is taken as a proxy for
19
internal distortion, the North Korean economy is likely to be even more distorted than the East
German economy was. On the basis of the East German experience, this shock was calibrated as
 
one half to two-thirds of the value of the 1990 pre-opening capital stock in Noland, Robinson,
and Scatasta (1997).  In the current model, calibrated to 1996, the capital stock already has
shrunk, and the obsolescence shock is assumed to be smaller at 25 percent.  
20       In the interests of parsimony, we report only the experiments in which North Korea undergoes complete
21
liberalization  and suffers an “obsolescence shock” reduction of one-quarter of its capital stock (unless otherwise
indicated).  In the customs union experiments and the monetary union experiments, where there is no capital
mobility, we apply a uniform 18 percent increase in TFP.  In the monetary union scenario, in which cross-border
capital transfers occur, we report the North Korea adopting South Korean technology results unless otherwise
noted.
        From the South Korean perspective, the customs union would create nearly $4 billion in trade and divert
22
less than $1 billion from the rest of the world.




The key result is that the impact on South Korea of product market integration in the
customs union scenario would have a very modest positive impact.   Trade with North Korea
21
would mostly substitute for trade with other countries and, given the small size of North Korea
relative to South Korea, trade creation and diversion would have a trivial impact on South
Korea.    Only three sectors would experience percentage changes in output of more than one
22
percent and South Korean GDP would rise by less than one half of one percent.   Formation of
23
the customs union would be a Pareto-improvement: returns to all factors would either increase or
remain unchanged.  The distributional implications would be trivial.
In contrast, formation of the customs union would amount to a significant movement
toward free trade for North Korea relative to its previous external barriers.  The share of trade in
national income would more than triple, led by a tremendous increase in light manufactured
exports.  Trade with both South Korea and the rest of the world would increase, and from the
standpoint of the whole peninsula, the customs union would be strongly trade creating. In North
Korea, there would be enormous changes in the composition of output: light manufacting output
would more than double,  and construction activity would increase by more than half,  while rice
and capital goods production would fall significantly (Figure 1). Overall, the agriculture sector
shrinks and more than two million workers leave agriculture for other employment, primarily in
light manfacturing and construction. Despite the contraction of the agricultural sector, domestic
food availability would improve however, rising from 3.2 million metric tons equivalent in the
base to 7.4 million metric tons after the formation of the customs union.  This would raise       This specification of “needs” or “demands” in physical terms without reference to prices or opportunity
24
costs may strike economists as odd.  This is the normal methodology used by relief agencies, however.
       This is the efficiency gain associated with military demobilization.  The direct budgetary impact would be
25
higher.  Bae (1996) estimates that with unification, the elimination of duplicative intelligence operations,
diplomatic missons, etc. might generate budgetary savings of around $500 million for the peninsula as a whole.
16
domestic food availability from below the minimum human needs target of 3.7 million metric tons
specified by the FAO/WPF/UNDP to above the 4.8 million metric tons normal human demand
target (Figure 2).   GDP would increase by more than one-third.  Returns to capital and all
24
classes of labor would rise; returns to land would fall.  GDP for the peninsula as a whole would
rise by 1.5 percent.
Economic integration could well be accompanied by a reduction in political tensions (or
indeed, political integration).  As an illustrative experiment we reduced military expenditures in
North and South Korea to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) average of 2.5 percent of GDP.  Again, for South Korea, this “peace dividend” would be
relatively minor, less than $300 million.   However for the far more militarized North Korea, the
25
impact would be much larger, adding another ten percent to GDP on top of the gains from
formation of the customs union.  In this scenario, North Korea would achieve the
FAO/WFP/UNDP total normal demand target of 7.8 million metric tons.  For the peninsula as a
whole, the peace dividend would be 0.3 percent of GDP.  Per capita income in the North would
remain less than a tenth that in the South under this scenario. 
Factor Market Integration
This basic story — large impact on North Korea, small impact on South Korea — would
change considerably if factor markets were allowed to integrate.  With exchange rate (monetary)
unification, it is natural to expect the capital market, if not the labor market, to integrate.  For
heuristic purposes, however, we initially consider a hypothetical case in which the inter-Korean
labor market integrates but the inter-Korean capital market does not (that is to say, labor flows
from North to South, but capital does not flow in the other direction).  This could happen if, for
example,  North Korea suddenly were to collapse à la East Germany before political       This benchmark is derived from comparisons of inter-jurisdictional differences in levels of per capita
26
income among South Korean provinces, US states, and members of the EU.  It is thought of as a level of per
capita income convergence sufficient to choke off the incentives for mass migration and to maintain social
stability.  It is used in this study to facilitate comparison with previous studies. See Noland (1997) for further
discussion and citations.
       We have assumed that this migration solely takes the form of North Korea - South Korea migration.  It is
27
quite possible that in reality there might also be emigration to other destinations, in particular China.  If this were
the case, it would obviously effect the precise calculation of migration necessary to achieve the income
convergence target.
       We have treated the capital movement as a pure grant.  It is also possible to calculate the rents and impute
28
them to South Korean national income as remitted profits, as is done in the following section.
       In the North, the increases in the capital-labor and land-labor ratios together with the increase in TFP,
29
would generate a considerable increase in the North Korean agricultural wage which converges to the South
Korean level.  Urban wages in the North would remain significantly below the South Korean level, however.  In
17
rapprochement and cross-border capital flows had occured.  To examine this possiblity, we posit a
case in which labor migrates until per capita income in the North is 60 percent that of the South,
as has been done in previous literature.   In this case, North Korea would be virtually
26
depopulated (more than 90 percent of the population migrates) before the 60 percent per capita
income target was attained. This extreme result serves to underscore the critical importance of
generating capital inflows into North Korea.  
27
In the more plausible converse case, where capital flows North and North Korea adopts
South Korean technology, but labor is not permitted to move South, nearly $700 billion of new
investment (more than a quarter of the South Korean capital stock) would be required to move in
order to attain the per capita income target, underlining the implicit trade-off between capital and
labor flows as equilibrating adjustment mechanisms.
28
Having established the extreme bounds of cross-border factor mobility necessary to
achieve the per capita income convergence target, we focus on an intermediate case in which
there is a degree of cross-border movement in both labor and capital. Park (1997), on the basis of
the German experience, estimated that with unification, two million North Korean workers might
migrate South.  Assuming that TFP increased by 18 percent, South Korea has to invest $541
billion in the North (more than a fifth of the South Korean capital stock) for North Korea to attain
the 60 percent per capita income target.   If this transfer were to occur over ten years, it would
29this sense the attainment in this scenario of the 60 percent per capita income target and the posited implications
for cross-border migration and social stability may be a bit misleading: for most North Koreans, wage income
would still be far less than earned by equivalent labor classes in the South.
        One could think of the transfer of capital from South to North Korea taking the form of grants or private
30
investment.  In the former case, capital would be transferred to the North, and there it would remain, providing
economic benefits to the Northern economy.  In the latter case, Southern investors would retain ownership, and
the investments would yield a stream of remitted profits adding to Southern income.  In the event of unification,
actual transfers would probably reflect a mix of grants (perhaps funding public infrastructure) and private profit-
making investments (factories, etc.).
18
imply a transfer of roughly ten percent of GDP annually — significantly higher than the amount in
the German case.
In this scenario, real GDP would rise tremendously in North Korea and fall slightly in
South Korea in response to these factor movements. Output would rise in all sectors in North
Korea, except in the public administration and military sectors which, by construction, remain
constant.  Conversly, output would fall in all sectors in South Korea (except in public
administration and the military).
However, the existence of cross-border factor flows raises the possibility that GDP could
differ significantly from GNP if migrants were to remit wage income or if foreign investment were
to generate repatriated profits.   In the extreme case in which all incomes earned by migrants and
30
foreign investment are remitted to their sources, profits from investment in the North largely
would offset the negative impact in the South of the monetary union with the North.  The North
would still come out substantially ahead.  Income for the combined Koreas would rise as the
returns to factors are equalized in the two economies, with combined income exceeding the base
by roughly 12 percent. 
Foreign Capital Inflow
In the compartive static simulations thus far, the process of capital transfer literally
amounts to taking capital from the South Korean capital stock and moving it north.  It would be
desirable to model external capital inflows as well.  In the comparative statics set-up, one could
model capital inflow as either an exogenous increase in the capital stock (which would not affect
the current account balance) or as an exogenous increase in the trade or current account deficits19
(which would not affect the capital stock).  One could think of the latter as representing the
moment imported capital goods are purchased, and the former as representing the moment they
are installed. 
In the extreme case, all investment in North Korea could come from abroad.  In this
scenario, more than $600 billion of capital inflow (together with the emigration of two million
workers) would be necessary to reach the per capita income target.  (More capital would be
necessary than in the previous internal transfer case since the South Korean capital stock would
be unaffected and as a consequence South Korean per capita incomes would be higher in this
scenario.)
A key issue is how the inflow of foreign capital would affect the real exchange rate.  To
explore this issue, we took the unified exchange rate and subjected it to a series of trade balance
shocks that would leave the measured capital stocks in the two countries unaffected.  (These
should be thought of as medium-to-long run effects, abstracting from short-run monetary shocks
that the KIM is poorly suited for modeling.)  The experiments are summarized in Figure 3, which
depicts the real exchange rate appreciation in response to foreign capital inflows.   Suppose the
$600 billion inflow were to occur at a steady linear rate over a decade (i.e. $60 billion annually). 
As the real exchange rate appreciated, the level of output in the South Korean traded-goods
sectors would fall, while the non-traded goods sectors (construction and services) would exhibit
increases in output (Figure 4).    (Public administration and the military are fixed by assumption
and show no output response.)  The real exchange rate appreciation would also adversely affect
the traded-goods sector in North Korea, though some traded-goods sectors such as light
manufacturing and mining would continue to register significant increases in output relative to the
highly distorted base (Figure 5). 
CONVERGENCE
Thus far the process of economic integration has been analyzed using comparative static
models to examine a number of key issues.  The integration process, however, is inherently
temporal, as investment and technological upgrading cannot occur instantaneously.  Moreover, in
the previous section, technological change was treated as a sectorally uniform process, and the       One could also rationalize the linkage of capital investment and productivity convergence along the lines
31
of the management perspective of Dyck (1997) who argues that in the German case, replacement of East German
managers with West German managers was key to enterprize rehabilitation and viability.
       Noland, Robinson, and Liu (1999) contains a decomposition, a graphical explication, and some modeling
32
results pertaining to these two effects.  In the interests of brevity, we only report the case in which North Korea
adopts South Korean technology in this paper.
20
amount of TFP increase was calibrated from the work of Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister. 
However, the specific case in hand may differ fundamentally from the generic phenomenon
they analyzed.  For the purposes of their regression model, Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister
classify South Korea as a developing country.  Thus no technological spillovers would be
attributed to North Korea importing capital goods from the South.  Moreover, in the exchange
rate unification/monetary union simulations, we allowed cross-border factor flows; in particular,
we allowed capital to move from South to North Korea.  In this case, it would be plausible to
expect that the North would adopt South Korean technology embodied in the capital. The
rationale is that as the two economies integrated, the relative price structure of North Korea, the
smaller economy, would begin to converge toward that of the larger economy, South Korea.
Moreover, as new plants in North Korea were built using South Korean capital, and new
production technologies were adopted in North Korea, this process would change the allocation
of basic inputs and produced intermediates. As South Korean techniques become the norm, the
input-output coefficients in the North should converge to those of the South.  These coefficients
would be presumably optimal given the existing factor prices and distortions in South Korea, so
their adoption by North Korea would imply the elimination of internal distortions which we are
unable to model explicitly.   Operationally, the North’s production function shift parameter (its
31
productivity level) increases to the level of the South’s, and the North adopts South Korea’s
intermediate input mix in the form of the South’s input-output coefficients.
32
The critical question is how rapidly this convergence occurs.  The standard result from
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) is that, conditional on a variety of other factors, per capita
income in poorer regions tends to converge on per capita incomes in richer areas at around two
percent annually.  Yet one might expect the rate of convergence after a fundamental regime
change to be faster than the steady states analyzed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin.  Once again we       See Hughes Hallet and Ma (1992), Burda and Funke (1993), Herz and Roger (1995), Sinn (1995), Schalk
33
and Untiedt (1996), Boltho, Carlin, and Scaramozzino (1997), Keller (1997), and Rummel (1997).  The estimates
of convergence appear to vary for two reasons.  First, it is difficult to disentangle productivity gains from the
large increase in public and private investment in East Germany that occurred post-unification.  Second, the
sample period is relatively short.  Hence the  coefficient estimates appear to be sample and specification sensitive.
       This comparison is a bit inexact in that the transfers in the German case are measured as public transfers,
34
while in our case the figure could include private investment flows.
21
turn to the literature on German unification and find that the estimates of the speed of East
German technological convergence vary enormously, with upper end estimates of technological
convergence on the order of ten to 12 percent annually.
33
The economic implications of this uncertainty is illustrated in Figure 6 where we ran the
model imposing from two to twelve percent annual technological convergence, with both the
sectoral level of TFP and the input-output mix in North Korea converging to the South Korean
norm over a period of ten years.  We then calculated the amount of capital transfer necessary to
reach the 60 percent benchmark.  Of course, this calculation assumes that the rate of technological
convergence and the volume of capital flows are independent — at least above an investment
threshold. As shown in Figure 6, assuming two percent technological convergence and no labor
migration, it would take more than $600 billion in investment in the North to reach the 60 percent
benchmark after ten years.  This figure falls by more than half, to less than $300 billion, if twelve
percent convergence is assumed.  Indeed, convergence rates of less than ten percent imply larger
transfers as a share of GDP than in the German case.
34
This treatment is not fully satisfactory for two reasons.  The previous treatment is
inadequate in that it is not a true dynamic model — it is simply the imposition of a temporal
pattern of technological change on the comparative statics model, and choice of a ten-year period
is arbitrary (though Kwon (1997) argues that this was sufficient for convergence in Germany).
Furthermore, as demonstrated in the previous section, labor migration can act as a substitute for
capital investment, and migration must be taken into account in estimating investment
requirements.  So for our final set of experiments, we specified a simple recursive dynamic model
in which  labor force growth is set on the basis of demographic projections, capital is accumulated       The labor force growth of the two economies was set exogenously on the basis of economically active labor
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force projections released by the Ministry of National Unification.  TFP growth rates were set exogenously on
the basis of econometric estimates. Capital accumulation was calibrated to reproduce the pattern of economic
growth observed over the period 1991-1996.  The KIM is essentially a long-run equilibrium model and is not
designed to capture short-run cyclical effects.  We assume that the cross-border factor flows occur at a constant
rate over the course of a decade.  In reality, these could occur with considerable abruptness.  Endogenization of
the cross-border factor flow is an obvious direction for future research. 
       We assumed that the transfers to the North come completely at the expense of investment in the South (i.e.
36
there is complete crowding out of investment, and no crowding out of consumption or foreign direct investment).
This scenario would generate a bit more slowing of South Korea’s rate of capital accumulation and growth rate
than if investment in the North were allowed to crowd out all components of absorption.  In this experiment we
ignore the role of foreign capital which was discussed in the previous section.
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as a constant share of output, and the rate of TFP change is set exogenously.
35
Suppose that monetary (exchange rate union) occured instantaneously in 1996 (the year
for which the model is calibrated) and over the course of ten years two million North Koreans
migrated to South Korea, technological convergence occurred at the mid-range estimate of six
percent a year, and a portion of South Korean capital accumulation is invested in the North until
the rate of return on capital equalized in the two Koreas.  This would imply a $641 billion
36
transfer over ten years or about 11 percent on South Korea’s annual GDP — significantly more
than the value of public transfers in the German case.
As shown in Figures 7 and 8, this scenario would amount to a tremendous (to the point of
implausibility) positive shock to the North Korean economy, a modestly negative shock to the
South Korean economy, and a moderately positive shock from the perspective of the peninsula as
a whole.  At the end of ten years, output would be around seven percent higher than under the
baseline projection.  In South Korea, monetary union and cross border factor flows would reduce
the rate of GDP growth in South Korea by about one percent a year.  If one were to attribute all
migrants income to North Korea and assume that all profits on investment in the North were
repatriated to South Korea, then the impact would be moderated, and the growth rate of South
Korean GNP would fall by only about one half of one percent.  
This result raises the issue of distribution.  There are three ways to think about the
distributional effects in this set-up: comparisons between North and South Korea, comparisons
between the outcomes after economic integration relative to the 1996 base, and comparisons23
between these outcomes to what is projected absent integration.  The first is the simplest and
possibly the most important: rates of return for capital and labor would (partly) converge between
North and South Korea, but the convergence is not sufficient to attain the 60 percent per capita
income target (Figure 9).  (The ratio of per capita incomes at the end of the period would be
about 55 percent.)  This result implies that, even in this relatively optimistic scenario, per capita
income in North Korea would remain well below the level in South Korea for an extended period
of time, implying either some method of restraining migration, or alternatively, higher levels of
migration than contemplated in this experiment.  Indeed, under the assumptions of a six percent
rate of technological convergence and two million migrants, the capital transfer necessary to hit
the 60 percent per capita income target would drive the rate of return on capital in North Korea
below that in South Korea.  If a more rapid rate of technological convergence (say, 12 percent
instead of six percent) is assumed, it wold be possible to attain the 60 percent target before the
rates of return on capital were equalized.  Allowing some of the North Korean capital
accumulation to be financed by foreign capital inflows would reduce the direct burden on South
Korean, but make achieving the 60 percent target more difficult. It would mean less crowding out
of South Korean domestic investment, more rapid South Korean growth, and, as a consequence, a
higher level of target income.
In South Korea, economic integration with North Korea would generate a shift in income
away from labor and toward capital, regardless of whether transfers to the North were considered
grants or profit-making investments, and within labor away from low-skilled groups and toward
higher skilled groups (Figure 10). To the extent that high-skill labor groups tend to be the
predominate owners of capital, this result implies that, absent some compensatory redistribution
policies, the process of economic integration would be accompanied by increased income and
wealth inequality in the South.   In comparison to the no-integration base, all classes of labor
would lose.  However, compared to the base of 1996, the wages of low-skill labor would fall,
while the wages of high-skill would labor rise (albeit less than in the no integration scenario). 
Capital would benefit in both comparisons.  As a consequence, these distributional implications
would likely be apparent to those concerned. 24
CONCLUSION
Previous work (Noland, Robinson, and Liu; 1998) examined the possibility of Pareto-
improving economic integration on the Korean peninsula. This relatively optimistic result crucially
depended on two modeling assumptions.  First, it depended on the assumption that the form of
capital transfer to the North took the form of profit-making investment, which yielded a stream of
remitted profits to Southern investors, and second that technological convergence between the
North and the South was relatively rapid.
This paper has taken a second look at these issues, using more recent data on the North
Korean economy unavailable at the time of the Noland, Robinson, and Liu work, and calibrating
the rate of technological convergence in the updated model on the basis of estimates of
convergence in the German case.  The availability of new data has also facilitated the examination
of famine-related issues and the possibility of a “peace dividend” associated with military
demobilization which were not addressed in the earlier literature.
The main finding of this paper is that economic integration between North and South
Korea would have enormous effects on the North Korean economy.  Formation of a customs
union between North and South Korea, for example, would represent a significant movement
toward free trade on the part of the North, bringing with it a variety of benefits.  The effects of
the ongoing famine, for example, could be ameliorated through this approach. If economic
integration were accompanied by military demobilization, the highly militarized North Korean
economy would experience a significant peace dividend as well.
With regard to South Korea, product market integration would have a trivial impact.
However, factor market integration could have a significant effect on South Korea, in terms of the
composition of output, the distribution of income, and the rate of economic growth.  Depending
on the magnitude of capital inflows from the rest of the world (and the degree of real exchange
rate appreciation), the nontraded goods sectors could expand at the expense of the traded goods
sectors. 
Assuming that the rate of technological convergence was in the middle range of estimates
from the German literature, with gradual equalization of rates of return on capital between the
two economies and with a reasonable amount of cross-border migration, per capita incomes in the25
North would still only reach 55 percent those of the South at the end of a decade.  Indeed, under
these assumptions, the amount of capital investment necessary to raise Northern per capita
incomes to 60 percent those of the South would actually drive the rate of return on capital in the
North below that in the South.  However, it would be possible to attain the 60 percent target
without such equalization of the rate of return in the two parts of Korea under high-end estimates
of the speed of technological convergence. This suggests that either the rate of technological
convergence would have to be very rapid (say, 12 percent annually), or restriction on migration
from the North to the South would have to be imposed on a semi-permanent basis.
In South Korea, economic integration with North Korea would generate a shift in income
away from labor and towards capital, regardless of whether transfers to the North were
considered grants or profit-making investments, and within labor away from low-skill groups and
toward high- skill groups.  This suggests that absent some compensatory redistribution policies,
the process of economic integration would be accompanied by increased income and wealth
inequality in the South.   Indeed, in the dynamic simulations, high-skilled workers would
experience rising wages, while wages paid to lower skilled labor would fall.
This paper could be considered an example of rigorous speculation in that we have
attempted to bring to bear rigorous technical methods to an important issue where the existent
data is fragmentary and in all likelihood error-ridden.  We have attempted to avoid spurious
precision.  What the model documents is that the process of Korean economic integration would
involve some significant trade-offs, and we have attempted to document where the “large
numbers” would be found.  The robustness of the results are obviously an issue in any such
exercise, and through the design of our experiments and scenarios, we have attempted to convey a


























































































































































































































































































Base Scenario 1: Trade Liberalization, productivity
increase, capital obsolescence shock
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e       For a detailed treatment of Social Accounting Matrices see Pyatt and Round (1985), Stone (1986), or
37
Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson (1994).
26
APPENDIX 1: SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRICES
The KIM utilizes two main databases for North Korea, a macroeconomic and a
microeconomic Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of North Korea for 1996. A SAM is a
consistent array of economic transactions among agents that reconciles the input-output and
national accounts.  Each non-zero cell in the SAM represents the value of an economic
37
transaction between actors. The accounts of the SAM define the transactions and income flows
among five basic actors in the economy: producers/enterprises, households, government, capital
account and the rest of the world. The input-output notion of inter-industry linkages is
generalized to the idea that each actor's purchase is another actor's sale. Any flow of money from
one actor to another is recorded in the SAM as a payment by some actor (the column) to some
other actor (the row). The SAM also generalizes the national income accounting notion that
income equals expenditure. The SAM must in fact be balanced: the total sum of each column must
be equal to the total sum  of each row, so that a budget constraint is imposed on each productive
sector, labor category, household type and so forth. This means that (1) costs (plus distributed
earnings) exhaust revenues for products, (2) expenditure (plus taxes and savings) equals income
for each agent, and (3) demand equals supply for each commodity.
The SAM is divided into a number of blocs. The Activities bloc describes the costs and
revenues for domestic producers. In the columns, the producers buy intermediate inputs, make
value-added payments to primary factors, and transfer indirect, value-added and export taxes to
(or receive subsidies from) the government. In the rows, they sell goods on domestic and foreign
markets. The Commodities bloc describes markets for final products. The row describes sales on
the domestic market, distinguishing between intermediate, consumption and investment demand.
The column identifies absorption, which equals the value of domestic products sold on the
domestic markets plus imports (valued at world prices), consumption taxes, value-added taxes
and tariffs. The Factors bloc describes value-added payments to primary factors (in the row) and
their distribution to specific institutions (enterprises, households, and government) plus the payment of





     GAMS is designed to make complex mathematical models easier to construct and understand.  In our case,
38
we use it to solve a large, fully-determined, non-linear CGE model (where the number of equations and number
of variables are equal), although GAMS is suitable for solving linear, non-linear, or mixed integer programming
problems as well.  For a thorough introduction to model-building in GAMS, see Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus
(1988).
     There are a few other syntax rules and conventions that appear in the equations shown below.  The “$”
39
introduces a conditional “if” statement in an algebraic statement.  For example, PM(i,k,cty1)$imi(i,k,cty1) = xxx
will carry out the expression shown for all PM(i,k,cty1) that belong to the set imi(i,k,cty1); in other words,
calculate an import price for all sectors in which there are imports.  
27
APPENDIX 2: STRUCTURE OF THE KIM-CGE MODEL 
Solving the CGE Model
The two-country CGE model presented here has been developed and solved using a
package called the General Algebraic Modeling System (or GAMS).   To a great extent, the
38
GAMS representation of model equations is easily read as standard algebraic notation.  Subscripts
indicating countries, sectors, or factors appear in parentheses [X  becomes X(i,j)], and a few ij
special symbols are used to indicate algebraic operations [E E becomes SUM, A A becomes PROD]. 
For example, the Cobb-Douglas consumer price index equation:
is represented in GAMS as:
PINDCON  =  PROD(I, PC(I)**pwtc(i,k)) 
where PROD stands for the product operator A A, the I at the left of the parenthetic expression is
the sectoral index over which summation occurs, and the two asterisks (**) indicate
exponentiation.   
39
Table I lists the countrywide, sectoral, and factor classifications used in the model, as well
as identifying the sectoral subsets that are needed in the equations of the model.  Table II contains
the variable definitions used in the CGE model. Table III contains the parameter definitions that
appear in the model equations. 28
Price block
EXR(k)  Exchange rate
GDPDEF(k) GDP deflator
PC(i,k) Consumption price of composite good
PD(i,k)  Domestic prices
PDA(i,k)  Processors actual domestic sales price
including subsidy
PE(i,k,cty1) Domestic price of exports
PEK(i,k)  Average domestic price of exports
PINDEX(k) Output price index
PINDOM(k) Domestic good price index
PINDCON(k)  Consumer price index
PM(i,k,cty1)  Domestic price of imports
PQ(i,k)  Price of composite goods
PREM(i,k)  Premium income from import rationing
PVA(i,k)  Value added price including subsidies
PVAB(i,k)  Value added price net of subsidies
PWE(i,cty1,cty2) World price of exports
PWM(i,cty1,cty2) World price of imports
PX(i,k)  Average output price
TM2(i,k,cty1) Import premium rates
Production block
D(i,k)  Domestic sales of domestic output
E(i,cty1,cty2)  Bilateral exports
EK(i,k)  Aggregate sectoral exports
INT(i,k)  Intermediate demand
M(i,cty1,cty2)  Bilateral imports 
Q(i,k)  Composite goods supply
SAD2(i,k)  Super AD2 parameter
SMQ(i,k,cty1)  Import value share in total sectoral 
                                    Demand
X(i,k)  Domestic output
Factor block
AVWF(iff,k)  Average wage with current weights
FDSC(i,iff,k)  Factor demand by sector
FS(iff,k)  Factor supply
FT(k) Factor tax
WF(iff,k)  Average factor price
WFDIST(i,iff,k)  Factor differential
YFCTR(iff,k)  Factor income
Migration block
WGDFL(la,k,lb,l)  Wage differentials
MIGL(la,k)  Labor migration flows (within category)
MIGRU(la,k)  Labor migration flows (across category)
Income and expenditure block
CDD(i,k)  Private consumption demand
CONTAX(k) Consumption taxes
DST(i,k) Inventory investment demand
ENTSAV(k)  Enterprise savings
ENTAX(k)  Enterprise taxes
ENTT(k)  Government transfers to enterprises
ESR(k)  Enterprise savings rate
EXPTAX(k)  Export tax revenue
FBAL(k)  Overall current account balance
FBOR(k)  Foreign borrowing by government
FKAP(k) Foreign capital flow to enterprises
FSAV(k,cty1)  Bilateral net foreign savings
FSAVE(k) Foreign savings
FTAX(k) Factor taxes
GD(i,k)  Government demand by sector
GDTOT2(k)  Government nonmilitary real
consumption
GOVSAV(k)  Government saving
GOVREV(k)  Government revenue
HHT(k)  Government transfers to households
HSAV(k)  Aggregate household savings
HTAX(k)  Household taxes
ID(i,k)  Investment demand (by sector of origin)
INDTAX(k)  Indirect tax revenue
MPS(hh,k)           Savings propensities by households
REMIT(k)  Remittance income to households
TARIFF(k,cty1)  Tariff revenue
VATAX(k)  Value added taxes
YH(hh,k)  Household income
YINST(ins,k)  Institutional income
ZFIX(k)  Fixed aggregate real investment
ZTOT(k)  Aggregate nominal investment
GDP calculations
RGDP  Real GDP
GDPVA(k) Value added in market prices GDP
OBJECT Value of objective function
WALRAS Walras law for system
WALRAS1(k) Walras law for each country on balance
of trade
WALRAS2(k) Walras law for each country on saving
& investment
WALRAS3(i,k) Adding up constraint for smq
Table I: Variables in the KIM-CGE Model29
Countries and regions
CTY1, CTY2  Universe               NK NORTH KOREA
SK SOUTH KOREA
RT REST OF THE WORLD
K(CTY1)  Countries          NK NORTH KOREA
                                                            SK SOUTH KOREA
Sectors and groupings
I,J Sectors of production            RICE RICE
OGRAIN OTHER GRAIN
AGOTH OTHER AGRICULTRAL PRODUCTS
              MINING    MINING
              LMANUF    LIGHT MANUFACTURES
              INTERM    INTERMEDIATE GOODS
              KGOODS    CAPITAL GOODS




im(i,k)  Import sectors
imn(i,k)        Non-import sectors
ie(i,k)         Export sectors
ien(i,k)        Non-export sectors
imi(i,k,cty1)   Bilateral imports in base data 
iei(i,k,cty1)   Bilateral exports in base data
ie1(i,k) Aggregate CET export sectors
ied(i,k)       Downward sloping export demand from rest of world
ik(I) Capital and intermediate goods sectors (INTER, KGOODS) 
iag(I)         Agricultural sectors      (AGRFSH)
iagn(I) Non-agricultural sectors
iserv(I)       Service sector (SCV)
Factors and groupings




                               AGLAB       Rural agricultural labor
                               URBUNSK    Urban unskilled labor
                                                                                                    URBSKLD                      Urban skilled labor
Households and institutions
hh   Households         HHALL       Single household category
ins   Institutions       LABR      Labor
                              ENT       Enterprises
                                
Table II: Country, Sectoral and Factor Classifications in the KIM-CGE Model30
Basic model parameters
 AGINVRAT(K) Agregate investment rate
 CLES(i,hh,k)        Household consumption shares
 CTAX(i,k) Consumption tax rates
 EB(i,cty1,cty2)   Exports, base data
 EK0(i,k)            Total sectoral exports, all destinations, base data
 ELASTICITY(ielas,i,k) Sectoral elasticities
 ENTR(k)             Enterprise income tax rate
 FACTRES(iff,k) Social security taxes
 FS0(iff,k)          Aggregate factor supply, base data
 FTAX0(k) Factor tax rate
 GLES2(i,k)           Government non-military expenditure shares
 GOVRAT(k) government expenditure rate
 HHTR(hh,k)          Household income tax rate
 IO(i,j,k)           Input-output coefficients
 ITAX(i,k)           Indirect tax rates
 MPS(hh,k) Savings propensities by households
 PVAB0(i,k) Value added net of subsidies
 PWEB(i,cty1,cty2)   World price of exports, base data
 PWM0(i,cty1,cty2)   World market price of imports, base data
 PWTC(i,k)           Consumer price index weights (PQ)
 RATEX(i,k,cty1) Export rationing rate
 RATM(i,k,cty1) Import rationing rate
 RHSH(hh,k)          Household shares of remittance income  
 SECTRES(isec,i,k) Sectoral quantities and prices         
 SINTYH(hh,ins,k)    Household distribution of value added income    
 SPREM(i,k)          Share of premium revenue to the government
 SSTR(iff,k) Factor payment tax rate
 TARR(itarr,i,k,cty1) Sectoral tariff rates
 TE(i,k)             Tax rates on exports
 THSH(hh,k)          Household transfer income shares
 TM(i,k,cty1)        Tariff rates on imports
 VATR(i,k)           Value added tax rate
 ZSHR(i,k)           Investment demand shares
Production and trade function parameters
 AC(i,k) Armington function shift parameter
 AD2(i,k)             CES production function shift parameter
 AE(i,k)             CET export composition function shift parameter 
 AT(i,k)             CET function shift parameter
 ALPHA2(i,k) Coefficient in CES production function
 GAMMA(i,k,cty1)     CET export composition function share parameters
 GAMMAK(i,k)         CET function share parameter
 RHOC(i,k) Armington function exponent
 RHOE(i,k)  CET export composition function exponent
 RHOP(i,k) CES production function exponent
 RHOT(i,k)           CET function exponent
Table III: Parameters in the KIM-CGE Model31
(1)  X(i,k)  =  AD2(i,k)*( SUM(iff$FDSC0(i,iff,k), ALPHA2(i,iff,k)*FDSC(i,iff,k)**(-RHOP(i,k))) )**(-1/RHOP(i,k)) ;
(2) (1-ft(k))*WF(iff,k)*WFDIST(i,iff,k) = SCALE(i,k)*(1 - vatr(i,k))*pva(i,k)*AD2(i,k)*( SUM(f$FDSC0(i,f,k), ALPHA2(i,f,k)*FDSC(i,f,k)
                                                              **(-RHOP(i,k)))  )**((-1/RHOP(i,k)) - 1)*ALPHA2(i,iff,k)*FDSC(i,iff,k)**(-RHOP(i,k)-1);
(3) INT(i,k)   = SUM(j, IO(i,j,k)*X(j,k));
Table IV: Quantity Equations
(4) PM(imi,k,cty1)  = PWM(imi,k,cty1)*EXR(k) * (1 + TM(imi,k,cty1) + tm2(imi,k,cty1) ) ;
(5) PE(iei,k,cty1)  = PWE(iei,k,cty1) * (1 - te(iei,k))*EXR(k) ;
(6) PEK(ie,k)  = SUM(cty1$pt(k,cty1), PE(i,k,cty1) * E(i,k,cty1) ) / EK(i,k) ;
(7) PDA(i,k)  =  (1 - ITAX(i,k)) * PD(i,k) ;
(8) PQ(i,k)*Q(i,k)  = PD(i,k)*D(i,k) + SUM(cty1$imi(i,k,cty1), (PM(i,k,cty1)*M(i,k,cty1))) ;
(9) PX(i,k)*X(i,k)  = PDA(i,k)*D(i,k) + SUM(cty1$iei(i,k,cty1), (PE(i,k,cty1)*E(i,k,cty1))) ;
(10) PC(i,k)  = PQ(i,k) * (1 + CTAX(i,k)) ;
(11) PINDCON(k)  = PROD(i$pwtc(i,k), PC(i,k)**pwtc(i,k)) ;
(12) PVA(i,k)  = PX(i,k) - SUM(j,IO(j,i,k)*PC(j,k)) + PIE(i,k);
(13) PWE(i,cty1,cty2) = PWM(i,cty2,cty1) ;
Table V: Price Equations
Model Specification
In addition to eleven sectors for each country model, the model has seven factors of
production (agriculture labor, unskilled urban labor, skilled urban labor, capital and three types of
land), as identified in Table II.  The output-supply and input-demand equations are shown in
Table IV.  Output is produced according to a CES function of the primary factors (equation 1),
with intermediate inputs demanded in fixed proportions (equation 3).  Producers are assumed to
maximize profits, implying that each factor is demanded so that marginal product equals marginal
cost (equation 2).  In each economy, factors are not assumed to receive a uniform wage or
“rental” (in the case of capital) across sectors; “factor market distortion” parameters (the
WFDIST that appears in equation 2) are imposed fixing the ratio of the sectoral return to a factor
relative to the economywide average return for that factor.
The price equations are shown in Table V.  In equations 4 and 5, world prices are
converted into domestic currency, including any tax or tariff components.  Equation 13
guarantees cross-trade price consistency, so that the world price of country A's exports to country32
B are the same as the world price of country B's imports from country A.  Equation 6 defines the
aggregate export price as the weighted sum of the export price to each destination.  Equation 7
calculates the domestic price, net of indirect tax.  Equations 8 and 9 describe the prices for the
composite commodities Q and X.  Q represents the aggregation of sectoral imports (M) and
domestic goods supplied to the domestic market (D).  X is total sectoral output, which is a CET
aggregation of total supply to export markets (E) and goods sold on the domestic market (D). 
Equation 10 defines the consumption price of composite goods from the composite good price
(PQ) and consumption taxes (tc).  Equation 12 defines the sectoral price of value-added, or “net”
price (PVA), as the output price minus the unit cost of intermediate inputs (from the input-output
coefficients).
In the KIM-CGE model, the aggregate consumer price index in each region is set
exogenously (PINDCON in equation 11), defining the numeraire.  The advantage of this choice is
that solution wages and incomes are in real terms; moreover, since our Cobb-Douglas price index
is consistent with the underlying Cobb-Douglas utility function, the changes in consumption levels
generated by the model are exactly equal to the equivalent variation.  The solution exchange rates
in the sub-regions are also in real terms and can be seen as equilibrium price-level-deflated (PLD)
exchange rates, using the country consumer price indices as deflators.  The exchange rate for the
rest of the world is fixed, thereby defining the international numeraire. 33
(14) YFCTR(iff,k)  = SUM(i, (1-ft(k))*WF(iff,k)*WFDIST(i,iff,k)*FDSC(i,iff,k));
(15) TARIFF(k,cty1)  = SUM(i$imi(i,k,cty1), TM(i,k,cty1)*M(i,k,cty1)*PWM(i,k,cty1))*EXR(k) ;
(16) PREM(i,k)  = SUM(cty1$imi(i,k,cty1), TM2(i,k,cty1)*M(i,k,cty1)*PWM(i,k,cty1))*EXR(k) ;
(17) INDTAX(k)  = SUM(i, ITAX(i,k)*PD(i,k)*D(i,k)) ;
(18) EXPTAX(k)  = SUM((i,cty1), te(i,k)*PWE(i,k,cty1)*E(i,k,cty1)*EXR(k)) ;
(19) YINST("labr",k)  = SUM(la, (1 - sstr(la,k))*YFCTR(la,k)) ;
(20) YINST("ent",k)   = YFCTR("capital",k)*(1 - sstr(“capital”,k)) + EXR(k)*FKAP(k) - ENTSAV(k) - ENTAX(k) + ENTT(k) +
EXR(k)*ENTTF(k) + SUM(i,(1-sprem(i,k))*PREM(i,k)) - SUM(i, (scale(i,k)-1)*X(i,k)*(1-vatr(i,k))*PVA(i,k));
(21) YINST("prop",k)  = sum(land, YFCTR(land,k)*(1 - sstr(land,k))) ;
(22) YH(hh,k)   = SUM(ins, sintyh(hh,ins,k)*YINST(ins,k)) + rhsh(hh,k)*EXR(k)*REMIT(k) + HHT(k)*thsh(hh,k) ;
(23) ENTAX(k)   = ENTR(k)*(YFCTR("capital",k) + ENTT(k)) ;
(24) FTAX(k)   = SUM((iff,i), ft(k)*WF(iff,k)*WFDIST(i,iff,k)*FDSC(i,iff,k)); 
(25) HTAX(k)    = SUM(hh, hhtr(hh,k)*YH(hh,k)) ;
(26) VATAX(k)   = SUM(i, vatr(i,k)*PVA(i,k)*X(i,k)) ;
(27) CONTAX(k)  = SUM(i, CTAX(i,k)*PQ(i,k)*Q(i,k)) ;
(28) GOVREV(k)  = SUM(cty1, TARIFF(k,cty1)) + INDTAX(k) + EXPTAX(k) + FTAX(k) + HTAX(k) + CONTAX(k) +
                                            SUM(i,sprem(i,k)*PREM(i,k)) + ENTAX(k) + VATAX(k) + FBOR(k)*EXR(k);
(29) GOVSAV(k)  = GOVREV(k) - SUM(i, GD(i,k)*PC(i,k)) - HHT(k) - ENTT(k) - FPE(k) ;
(30) HSAV(k)     = SUM(hh, mpsv(hh,k)* ((1.0-hhtr(hh,k))*YH(hh,k)));
(31) ENTSAV(k)  = esr(k)*YFCTR("capital",k) ;
(32) ZTOT(k)  = GOVSAV(k) + HSAV(k) + ENTSAV(k) + EXR(k) * FSAVE(k);
(33) FSAVE(k)   = FBAL(k) - FKAP(k) - FBOR(k) - REMIT(k) -ENTTF(k) ;
(34) CDD(i,k) = SUM(hh, CLES(i,hh,k)*YH(hh,k)*(1.0-hhtr(hh,k))*(1.0-mps(hh,k))) / PC(i,k) ;
(35)  GD(narmy,k)  =  gles2(narmy,k)*GDTOT2(k) ;
(36) ZTOT(k)  = SUM(i, PC(i,k)*(ID(i,k) + DST(i,k)))  ;
(37) RGDP(k) =  SUM(i, var0(i,k)*X(i,k)) ;
(38) GDPVA(k)   =  SUM(i, PVAB(i,k)*X(i,k) + PREM(i,k)) + INDTAX(k) + SUM(cty1, TARIFF(k,cty1)) + CONTAX(k) ;
Table VI: Income and Expenditure Equations
The circular flow of income from producers, through factor payments to households,
government, and investors, and finally back to demand for goods in product markets is shown in
the equations in Table VI.  The country models incorporate official tariff revenue (TARIFF in
equation 15), which flow to the government, and the tariff equivalent of non-tariff barriers
(PREM in equation 16), which accrues as rents to the private sector. Each economy is modeled as
having a number of domestic market distortions, including sectorally differentiated indirect,
consumption, and value-added taxes as well as factor, household, and corporate income taxes
(equations 17-18 and 23-27).  The single household category in each economy has a Cobb-
Douglas expenditure function (equation 34).  Investment is set in equation 36. Aggregate real34
(39) X(ie1,k)  = AT(i,k)*(SUM(cty1$iei(i,k,cty1), GAMMA(i,k,cty1) *E(i,k,cty1)**(-RHOT(i,k)))
                          + (1-SUM(cty1, GAMMA(i,k,cty1)))*D(i,k) **(-RHOT(i,k)))**(-1/RHOT(i,k)) ;
(40) X(ien,k)  = D(ien,k) ; 
(41) E(i,k,cty1)/D(i,k)  =   RATEX(i,k,cty1)*(PDA(i,k)/PE(i,k,cty1)*
                           GAMMA(i,k,cty1)/(1 - SUM(cty2$PT(k,cty2), GAMMA(i,k,cty2))))**(1/(1+RHOT(i,k))) ;
(42) EK(i,k)   =   SUM(cty1, E(i,k,cty1)) ;
(43) M(i,cty1,cty2) =  E(i,cty2,cty1) ;
(44) E(ied,k,"rt") =   EB(ied,k)* (PWE(ied,k,"rt")/PWEB(ied,k))**(-etae(ied,k)) ;
(45) PWE(iedw,k,"rt")  =  PWERAT(iedw,k)*PWEFX(iedw)
(46) EKPTL(k)  =  SUM((cty1,i) , PWE(i,k,cty1)*E(i,k,cty1)) ;
(47) MKPTL(k)  =  SUM((cty1,ik), PWM0(ik,k,cty1)*M(ik,k,cty1)) ;
Table VII: Export Equations
(48) Q(im,k)  = AC(im,k)*(SUM(cty1$imi(i,k,cty1), DELTA(im,k,cty1)*M(im,k,cty1) **(-RHOC(im,k))) +
  (1- SUM(cty1$PT(k,cty1), DELTA(im,k,cty1)))*D(im,k) **(-RHOC(im,k)))**(-1/RHOC(im,k)) ;
(49) Q(imn,k)  =  D(imn,k)
(50) M(imi,k,cty1)/D(imi,k)  = RATM(imi,k,cty1) * 
(PD(imi,k)/PM(imi,k,cty1)*DELTA(imi,k,cty1) (1 - SUM(cty2$PT(k,cty2), DELTA(imi,k,cty2)))) **(1/(1+RHOC(imi,k))) ;
Table VIII: CES Import Demand Equations
government consumption is set fixed in the model, while sectoral government consumption is set
in equations 35.  Equation 37 and 38 are definitions for GDP value-added and real GDP.
Export-related functions are shown in Table VII.  Exports are supplied according to a
CET function between domestic sales and total exports (equation 39), and allocation between
export and domestic markets occurs in order to maximize revenue from total sales (equation 41). 
The rest of the world is modeled as a large supplier of imports to each country at fixed world
prices.  Rest of world demand for the North and South Korean exports is modeled as occurring at
fixed world prices. The world prices for North and South Korea are assumed to be exogenous —
a typical small country assumption.
The specification of CES functions for imports is shown in Table VIII.  We adopt the
notation convention that when k = cty1, we are describing the domestic component of composite
demand (D). Imn indicates non-importing sectors, therefore equation 49 shows that for non-
importing sectors, the demand is equal to the domestic production.35
(51) (AVWF(la,k)/EXR(k))  = wgdfl(la,k,la,l)*(AVWF(la,l)/EXR(l)) ;
(52) FS(la,k)  = FS0(la,k) + MIGL(la,k) + MIGRU(la,k) ;
(53) SUM(la, MIGRU(la,k))  = 0 ;
Table IX: Migration Relations
(54) Q(i,k)  = INT(i,k) + CDD(i,k) + GD(i,k) + ID(i,k) +DST(i,k) ;
(55) SAC(iff,k)*FS(iff,k) = SUM(i, FDSC(i,iff,k))  ;
(56) AVWF(iff,k)  = SUM(i, (1-ft(k))*wfdist(i,iff,k)*wf(iff,k)*fdsc(i,iff,k))/SUM(j, fdsc(j,iff,k)) ;
(57) FSAV(k,cty1)    =   SUM(i, PWM(i,k,cty1)*M(i,k,cty1))  -  SUM(i, PWE(i,k,cty1)*E(i,k,cty1))  ;
(58) FBAL(k)  = SUM(cty1, FSAV(k,cty1)) ;
Table X: Market-Clearing Equations
Table IX outlines the labor and capital migration relations in the model (which are in the
simulations reported in this paper). Cross-border capital and labor flows in this paper are
determined by the per capita GDP differentials between North and South Korea. The 60 percent
per capita income differential is used as the criteria to decide how  much capital from South Korea
and how  many people from North Korea need to be  moved in opposite direction across the
border. Internal migration in each country maintains a specified ratio of average real wages
between the rural and unskilled urban markets (the EXR terms become irrelevant).  Domestic
labor and capital supply in each country is then adjusted by the capital and labor movements
(equation 52), while the other two equations insure that workers do not “disappear” or get
“created” in the migration process.
To complete the model, there are a number of additional “market-clearing” or equilibrium
conditions that must be satisfied, as shown in Table X.  Equation 54 is the material balance
equation for each sector, requiring that total composite supply (Q) equal the sum of composite
demands.  Equation 55 provides equilibrium in each factor market;  Equation 57 is the balance
condition in the foreign exchange market, requiring that import expenditures equal the sum of
export earnings and net foreign capital inflows; equation 58 is the overall trade balance equation,
summing up the bilateral trade balances. 36
Model Closure
The KIM  model permits a number of different “closure” choices that affect the
macroeconomic relationships in the model.  In all simulations reported in this paper except in the
cases that we allow foreign capita inflow, we have assumed that the aggregate trade balance
(FBAL) is fixed for both countries, and that the exchange rate (EXR) varies to achieve external
balance in the customs union part of model. However, in the monetary union part of model, the
exchange rate is fixed between the North and South.  In addition, the balance of trade for the two
countries are also fixed and unified.  The separate North and South Korean trade balances can
vary, though their sum is fixed.  Government revenue is determined endogenously, given a variety
of fixed tax rates, while government expenditure is fixed exogenously. Aggregate investment in
each country is assumed to be a fixed share of GDP, and aggregate saving is assumed to adjust to
equate total savings and investment.37
Appendix Table 1 (a): Import Rationing Ratios (Actual over Desired)
Sector North Korea South Korea Rest of the World
RICE(NK) 1.0 1.0 0.072
RICE(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
OGRAIN(NK) 1.0 1.0 0.162
OGRAIN(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
AGOTH(NK) 1.0 1.0 0.145
AGOTH(SK) 0.223 1.0 1.0
MINING(NK) 1.0 1.0 0.682
MINING(SK) 0.037 1.0 1.0
LMANUF(NK) 1.0  0.263 0.274
LMANUF(SK) 0.05 1.0 1.0
INTERM(NK) 1.0 0.105 0.480
INTERM(SK) 0.447 1.0 1.0
KGOODS(NK) 1.0 0.060 0.258
KGOODS(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
CONSTR(NK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
CONSTR(SK) 1.0 1.0  1.0
PUBADM(NK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
PUBADM(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
ARMY(NK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
ARMY(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
SVC(NK) 1.0 1.0 0.532
SVC(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
Note: Sectors with NK or SK in parentheses indicate the rates of import rationing imposed with respect to themselves
and their respective foreign sectors. For example, the row of KGOODS(NK) shows that the rationing parameters
imposed  on the same sector in South Korea and the rest of the world are .060 and .258, respectively.  If the rationing
parameter is less than one, quantity restriction takes place. If the ration parameter is equal to one, there is no rationing. If
the rationing parameter is greater than one, import quantity diversion takes place. The smaller the ratio, the larger the
distortion. 38
Appendix Table 1 (b): Export Rationing Ratios (Actual over Desired)
Sector North Korea South Korea Rest of the World
RICE(NK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
RICE(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
OGRAIN(NK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
OGRAIN(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
AGOTH(NK) 1.0 0.223 0.996
AGOTH(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
MINING(NK) 1.0 0.037 0.264
MINING(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
LMANUF(NK) 1.0  0.050 0.140
LMANUF(SK) 0.263 1.0 1.0
INTERM(NK) 1.0 0.447 0.391
INTERM(SK) 0.105 1.0 0.984
KGOODS(NK) 1.0 1.0 0.999
KGOODS(SK) 0.06 1.0 0.998
CONSTR(NK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
CONSTR(SK) 1.0 1.0  1.0
PUBADM(NK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
PUBADM(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
ARMY(NK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
ARMY(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
SVC(NK) 1.0 1.0 0.590
SVC(SK) 1.0 1.0 1.0
Note: Sectors with NK or SK in parentheses indicate  the rates of export rationing imposed with respect to themselves
and their respective foreign sectors. For example, the row of INTERM(NK) shows that the rationing parameters
imposed on the same sector in South Korea and the rest of the world are .447 and 0.391 respectively. If the rationing
parameter is less than one, quantity restriction takes place. If the ration parameter is equal to one, there is no rationing. If
the rationing parameter is greater than one, export quantity diversion takes place.
Appendix Table 2: Elasticities 39
Sector  Import  Export  Import  Export
SK SK ROW ROW
Substitution Transformation Substitution Transformation
RICE(NK) 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.0
OGRAIN(NK) 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.0
AGOTH(NK) 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5
MINING(NK) 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.2
LMANUF(NK) 1.5 4.0 1.5 4.0
INTERM(NK) 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5
KGOODS(NK) 1.5 4.0 1.5 4.0
CONSTR(NK) 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.0
PUBADM(NK) 2.0 4.0 2.0 4.0
ARMY(NK) 2.0 4.0 2.0 4.0
SVC(NK) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Sector  Import  Export  Import  Export
NK NK ROW ROW
Substitution Transformation Substitution Transformation
RICE(SK) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
OGRAIN(SK) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
AGOTH(SK) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
MINING(SK) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
LMANUF(SK) 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.0
INTERM(SK) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
KGOODS(SK) 2.0 4.0 2.0 4.0
CONSTR(SK) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
PUBADM(SK) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
ARMY(SK) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
SVC(SK) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
 
Note: Sectors with NK and SK in parentheses indicate the substitution and transformation elasticities used in these sectors against
their respective partners. For example, the row of SVC(NK) shows that North Korean service sector’s elasticities of import
substitution and export transformation with respect to goods from the same sector of South Korea and the rest of the world are 2.  
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